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The hypothesis that sugar-containing drinks counteract depletion of self-control or ego 
resources is elegant and provocative because it entails that the origins of ego-energy and self-
control operations can be traced to a physiological substrate. However, this hypothesis has 
not withstood scientific scrutiny. Lange and Eggert (2014) presented two unsuccessful 
attempts to replicate effects of glucose on ego-depletion. Chatzisarantis and Hagger (this 
issue) argued that inconsistent findings may be due to experimental designs that expose 
participants to similar acts of self-control. This methodology may not provide a more 
rigorous test of the counteracting effects of glucose on ego-depletion because it does not 
control for factors (i.e., motivation) that interfere with glucose effects. In this article, we 
address Lange’s (in press) comments and explore the possibility that findings reported by 
Lange and Eggert’s (2014) and Hagger and Chatzisarantis’ (2013) studies are consistent. In 
addition, we discuss two factors that researchers may wish to take into consideration when 
designing experiments that aim to test effects of glucose, or glucose rinsing, on ego-
depletion. These factors are related to ego-depleting value of self-control tasks and type of 
motivation that may drive performance on such tasks. 
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Unsuccessful Attempts to Replicate Effects of Self Control Operations and Glucose 
on Ego-Depletion Pose an Interesting Research Question that Demands Explanation 
When researchers embark on a research project they hope to observe statistically-
significant findings that are consistent with their original hypothesis. Observing statistically 
non-significant results can be disappointing because such findings are difficult to interpret or 
get published. However, it is possible findings to be statistically non-significant but still 
consistent with the extant literature (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). In this article, we respond to 
Lange’s (in press) comments and explore the possibility that findings reported by Lange and 
Eggert (2014) and Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013) are consistent. In addition, we discuss 
two factors that researchers may wish to take into consideration when designing experiments 
that aim to test effects of glucose on ego-depletion: the ego-depleting value of self-control 
tasks and the type of motivation that may drive performance on such tasks. 
In our previous article (Chatzisarantis & Hagger, in press), we argued that Lange and 
Eggert (2013) did not detect effects of glucose on ego-depletion because negative feedback 
and cognitive evaluations developed during the first act of self-control likely undermined 
willingness to exercise self-control. We also suggested that experimental designs that expose 
participants to different acts of self-control may provide a more rigorous test of the 
counteracting effects of glucose on ego-depletion because they may control for factors (e.g., 
motivation) that interfere with glucose effects. Lange (in press) maintained that experimental 
designs that expose participants to similar acts of self-control provide rigorous tests of the 
glucose hypothesis and justified this conclusion on several grounds that we think are sound 
and with which we concur. Given this, and based on statistical credibility analysis, Lange 
(this issue) concluded that Hagger and Chatzisarantis’ (2013) studies overestimated the 
effects of glucose on ego depletion. We would, however, like to seize this opportunity to 
point out some serious problems with Lange’s conclusions based on the credibility analysis. 
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There are two issues that researchers should take into consideration when using 
Schimmack’s (2012) analysis. First, the value of the incredibility index (and average power 
of studies) is influenced by the effect size used in the analysis. For example, in Hagger and 
Chatzisarantis (2013) studies, the incredibility index is lower when one is using the average 
effect size than the meta-analytic effect size. We demonstrated this variability in the 
incredibility index by providing estimates for meta-analytic and average effect sizes. Lange 
(in press) favours the use of the meta-analytic effects size but this choice is based on the 
assumption that the effect size reported in Hagger et al. (2010) meta-analysis is homogenous. 
However, Hagger et al. (2010) meta-analysis is not sufficiently powerful to detect 
homogeneity in study results due to the small number of studies included in its estimation. In 
accordance with this proposition, Huedo-Medina, Sanchez-Meca, Marin-Martinez and 
Botella (2006) demonstrated that the power of meta-analyses, and indexes such as the Q or I2 
statistics, in detecting homogeneity in study results is less than .4 in meta-analyses with fewer 
than 20 studies. Hence, it may be premature to use incredibility index analysis to evaluate 
average power of studies because incredibility analysis should only be applied to a 
homogenous set of studies only (Ioanidis & Trikalinos, 2007).  
Second, incredibility indexes can detract researchers’ attention away from conducting 
research that aims to explain variability in study results if it is applied on a set of studies that 
are not homogenous. This is because “homogeneity” means that study results are not 
influenced by experimental designs or other factors that possibly moderate glucose effects. It 
is this cautious interpretation of homogeneity tests, alongside Lange and Eggert’s (2014) 
studies, that motivate us to address unsuccessful replications of the glucose hypothesis by 
looking into methodological factors. If the assumption of homogeneity in a set of studies 
examining a particular effect, such as those included in Lange and Eggert’s analysis of the 
glucose rinsing effect, is in question and researchers are faced with inconsistent results 
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among studies included in the set of studies, then a logical step toward resolving the true 
effect would be to attempt to identify possible moderators that may explain that 
inconsistency. Resolution cannot be deduced from an analysis, such as the incredibility 
analysis conducted by Lange and Eggert, where the homogeneity is in question. 
Lange (in press) also argued that our proposition that negative feedback explained 
their findings is not sound because negative feedback can actually increase motivation such 
as when it is mildly negative and not humiliating (Ryan, Koestner, & Deci, 1991). We agree 
with this argument but we clarify that our original suggestion is not necessarily restricted to 
negative effects of negative feedback, we also implied that our argument was also applicable 
to positive effects of negative feedback. To be more specific, if negative feedback enhanced 
motivation then ego-depletion effects should not be present in Lange and Eggert’s (2014) 
experiments. This is because motivation counteracts ego-depletion effects (Baumeister & 
Vohs, 2007). As a consequence, Lange and Eggert’s (2014) experimental design would not 
provide a rigorous test of whether glucose counteracted ego-depletion but whether it 
augmented effects of motivation on ego-depletion. Further, if motivation counteracted ego-
depletion effects then the control condition (i.e., the no-glucose condition) in Lange and 
Eggert experiments would be equivalent to a condition that does not induce ego depletion 
effects in typical ego-depletion experiments. As a result, Lange and Eggert’s (2013) findings 
would be consistent with Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013) results because Hagger and 
Chatzisarantis did not observe glucose effects over and above a condition that did not induce 
ego-depletion. In accordance with this reasoning, a closer look at Lange and Eggert’s (2014) 
findings reveals that ego-depletion effects were not consistently present in their experiments. 
Specifically, reductions in self-control performance were observed only on measures of 
interference-suppression and not on measures of inhibition in Study 2. In addition, in Study 1, 
in which Lange and Eggert used a delayed discounting paradigm, there is no evidence to 
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support ego-depletion effects. Given these findings, it seems plausible that task-related 
factors such as negative feedback masked the glucose effects by counteracting ego-depletion.   
The observation that Lange and Eggert (2014) did not observe ego-depletion effects 
consistently across studies is not news in the literature on ego-depletion (Hagger & 
Chatzisarantis, 2014). Hence, our suggestion that factors inherent to self-control tasks (i.e., 
negative feedback, boredom) mask ego-depletion or glucose effects may not be restricted to 
Lange and Eggert’s (2013) experiments but it may apply to other published or unpublished 
studies as well. As a case in point, consider the delayed discounting paradigm that Lange and 
Eggert (2013) used in their experiments. This paradigm, at least on the surface, appears to 
facilitate self-control exertion because it involves choice. In addition, as Lange (in press) 
contends, the delayed discounting paradigm produces similar discounting rates regardless of 
whether real payoffs or hypothetical rewards are used during choice. However, the fact that 
choice yields similar discounting rates does not necessarily mean that it does so via self-
control processes. As Frederick et al. (2003) pointed out, decisions made during the delayed 
discounting experiments may be rule-based and not necessarily function of the intentional 
system that we assume to induce ego-depletion (Solman et al., 2005). This is consistent with 
Baumeister et al.’s (1998) contention in the original experiments that tested the ego-depletion 
effect that tasks requiring the application of rules on a rote basis would not be depleting, and 
tasks require an element of response inhibition or impulse control. This issue was also raised 
in Hagger et al. (2010) in their meta-analysis who raised the question as to what, exactly, 
constitutes a self-control task. Hence, researchers should not take the capacity for a task to be 
ego-depleting for granted, there may be a need to reconsider the ego-depleting value of self-
control tasks when these tasks are performed in laboratory settings. Our suggestion to use real 
pay-offs in delayed discounting paradigms aimed to emphasise that detection of ego-
depletion (and glucose or ‘rinsing’ effects) may require that participants exert some minimal 
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levels of effort or involvement during self-control operations and that monetary rewards can 
increase task involvement by making choices more consequential. 
Apart from paying acute attention to ego-depleting value of self-control tasks, it may 
also be important to consider type of motivation that experimental manipulations induce 
during experimentation. There is a trend in the literature to think of motivation, and aversive 
experiences, as being part of ego-depletion processes. Lange (in press) for example argued 
that if the study of ego-depletion excluded tasks that induced negative affective experiences 
then many studies included in Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis would have to be regarded 
as methodologically inappropriate. Broadly speaking, we agree with Lange’s suggestion that 
negative affective experiences and motivation are part of self-control processes. On the other 
hand, however, it may be an overgeneralisation to suggest that all types of motivation are 
indicators of ego-depletion. 
To be more precise, an aversive state that involves feelings of being fatigued or worn 
out may be considered to be a “marker” of what we call an ego-depleted state (Baumeister et 
al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). However, in our opinion, we should not consider other states, 
such as amotivation, as indicators (or causes) of ego-depletion. This is because amotivation 
entails a de-evaluation of the task at hand whereas ego-depletion states do not necessarily 
imply negative task evaluation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). As another illustration, assume for a 
moment that a researcher uses an interesting puzzle as a self-control task. Puzzles can induce 
self-control operations because their solutions are not algorithmic but they require individuals 
to consider and supress alternative solutions. Assume also that the researcher asks 
participants to engage in the puzzle twice as a means of inducing ego-depletion. According to 
Deci and Ryan’s (1985) cognitive evaluation theory, this procedure is likely to motivate 
participants to exert equivalent levels of effort during their first and second attempts. Most 
relevant, such pattern of findings would be inconsistent with the strength model of self-
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control which suggest that repeated exposure to self-control tasks diminishes self-control 
performance. However, should it be concluded that this pattern of findings does not support 
the strength model of self-control? We think not. Although a cognitive analysis of inherently 
interesting tasks may lead researchers to conclude that puzzles induce self-control operations, 
an organismic analysis would question such a conclusion on grounds that inherently 
interesting puzzles facilitate intrinsic motivation (c.f. Moller et al., 2006). Hence, in addition 
to thinking in terms of whether (or how) amount of motivation is implicated in ego-depletion, 
we should also start thinking in terms of what type of motivation should we consider a 
marker of ego-depletion. 
In conclusion, we maintain that unsuccessful attempts to replicate effects of glucose 
on ego-depletion may be due to insufficient control of effects that factors inherent to self-
control tasks exert on ego-depletion. We also suggested that researchers may wish to pay 
attention to ego-depleting value of self-control tasks and the type of motivation when 
designing experiments that aim to examine effects of glucose on ego-depletion. Regardless of 
different opinions, approaches, or interpretations of existing findings, we propose that the 
inconsistent findings related to effects of glucose on ego-depletion raise fascinating research 
questions that demand further explanation.   
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